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As widely reported in the scientific literature, audits, benchmarking, safety performance indicators and 
accident data help the management to understand the current safety performance status and to individuate 
strong and weak areas of the safety management system. Additionally, being process safety incidents 
relatively rare, as evidenced in the Baker report on BP Texas City accident, safety performance cannot be 
measured effectively alone on the basis of such high profile incidents. In the first phase of the research 
program, process and occupational injuries were studied, collecting field data in a large process industry, over 
five-year observation. Technical and management improvements seem no longer sufficient to promote safety 
as at-risk behaviour and unsafe attitudes are still present in spite of all training, supervision and guidance. A 
thorough analysis on underlying causes connected with human failure was subsequently performed by 
designing a structured questionnaire, for both in-house and outsourced frontline workers. Data statistical 
analysis allowed quantifying four conceptual key dimensions within the firm, namely: individual behaviour, 
organizational climate, human resource management and plants/technology. Significant results were utilized 
to evidence individual and corporate elements affecting accident frequency for the two workforce types. 
Conclusions were focused on identifying technical and managerial options to reduce the likelihood of errors 
and increase risk resilience.  
1. Introduction 
Human factors always play a vital role in occurrence of accidents at the work place. Learning from previous 
failures is one of the pillars of modern approach to risk management: the ultimate goal of the industrial 
accident analysis is the generation of lessons learned in order to avoid accident recurrence (Sikorova et al., 
2017). Human factor can be defined as the study of all the elements that make easier to do the work in the 
right way, depending upon the relationship between humans, the tools and equipment used in the workplace 
and the work environment. Historically, the debate about the involvement of human factor in accident 
occurrence did not gain immense priority in the psychological domain, until the happening of some major 
industrial tragedies due to human blunder: collision of two jumbo jets at runway in Tenerife (1977), Three 
Miles Island incident in 1979 (Chen et al. 2013), and Seveso accident (Fabiano et al., 2017). Additionally, 
investigations in the maritime history, dealing with collision of two vessels, revealed that the role of human 
factor was pivotal for the coordination dilemma between vessels or members of same crew (Chauvin et al. 
2013) or for erroneous decisions made during emergency, causing accident escalation (Vairo et al., 2017).  
In the last few years, new pressures and related safety threats have been developing rapidly, e.g., cost cutting 
and downsizing, plant complexity and ageing, early retirement, outsourcing, job-hopping, and complacency; 
high profile process accidents still happen and emphasize the importance of process safety performance 
metrics to enable and maintain good safety management (De Rademaeker et al., 2014). It should be noted 
that human error is not necessarily due to incompetence, lack of motivation or lack of attention, but is 
determined by multiple occurrences for a particular situation and environment. It is however generally 
assumed that operators implement unintentional errors, although they might be well trained and safety-
educated, including real errors, violations, deviations and lapses. In Italy, a clear decreasing trend in 
occupational fatalities and injuries was observed in last three decades, but still there are redundant avoidable 
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injuries happening due to involvement of human factors. Typical reasons for this human failure can be 
classified as: lack of training or instruction; lack of motivation; lack of physical or mental ability; slips and 
lapses of attention (Fabiano et al. 2008). In this field, an ongoing effort is dedicated to shed more light on 
understanding the underlying cultural causes of safe environments (Reniers and Gidron, 2013). Different 
approaches were  developed to identify the most significant factors that influence the trend and severity of 
accidents at work in manufacturing and process industry, while the scientific community is facing emerging 
hazards connected to novel materials by developing novel tools suitable to identify preventive and protective 
measures under the so-called precautionary principle (Fabiano et al., 2019). The development of several 
accident analyses, which include ‘defenses in- depth’ such as, training, procedures, supervision and 
leadership, and communication networks techniques, tried to break accident trajectory in the process 
industries (Kontogiannis 2012). Reviewing and evaluating the source and residuum of accidents industrial 
setting, with the help of proper statistical analysis for a longer time span can provide solutions to enhance risk 
assessment and management (Fabiano and Currò, 2012). In this work, the actual role of human factor in a 
downstream oil industry was studied by elaborating a structured questionnaire focused at highlighting different 
aspects of safety culture and the overall level of risk perceptions of internal and outsourced workers. Results 
may help in properly using ALARP as a ruling principle in safety management accounting for the human factor 
and avoiding a static decision-making principle, where the fixed balance between the expected values and the 
safety concerns cannot be appropriate (Abrahamsen et al., 2017). 
2. Methodology 
The starting questionnaire was designed by consultation with three experts from management board and the 
HSE department of the refinery. In designing the questionnaire, an effort was made to cover all aspects of 
health and indicators and perform a careful assessment of the actual situation, based on data directly 
collected at the level of operational staff. The questionnaire was developed in a semi-structured interview by 
adopting, where possible, Likert-type scales, even in drawing and trying to maximize the number of categories 
based on the item of interest. It was distributed to the workers having familiarity with the hazards, occupational 
and process safety. The main purpose of questionnaire was intended to gather data on a number of control 
variables, taking into account personal characteristics of respondents. In order to evidence how firms try to 
reduce the occupational risk also for temporary employees, two separate questionnaires were developed. 
Even if essential for the differentiation of the results in relation to the activity/work area, some information were 
not reported due to a “cautionary interpretation of the law privacy". The questionnaire package was sent to all 
the workers of the facility, divided into daily and shift workers, having at least one-year experience with a 
response rate of 77.0 %. Globally, results were obtained from 507 internal workers of the downstream oil plant 
and 186 outsourced workers. A section of the questionnaire was designed to characterize technical, 
organizational and individual factors of people experiencing injuries or near misses: the actual number was 71 
among internal workers and 13 outsourced workers. Data were further processed by techniques of inferential 
statistics and ANOVA, in order to show significant correlations between accidents and involvement of human 
factors. Ideally, the defects of the process safety management can be evidenced and leading metrics to 
measure the performance of the process safety management can be elaborated. 
2.1 Questionnaire evaluation design 
The questionnaire was divided in four axes or dimensions for the evaluation, performed on the basis of the 
answers to “key questions“. For each dimension, three items were considered to characterize the workers, as 
summarized in Table 1. The evaluation of the four dimensions was presented using a radar diagram 
developed ad hoc and structured on three semi-quantitative levels: critic (range 0-1-red), acceptable (range 1-
2 yellow) and optimal (range 2-3-green), highlighted by different colours for an immediate visual understanding 
in Figures 1-4. The most significant results from the evaluation were systematized according to the following 
key points: 
• elements of consistency: show the main significant results, a positive value, consistent with an optimal 
policy of the HSE management of the industry; 
• elements of diversion: highlight the main results in statistically significant value, in the range that goes 
from minor deficiencies to potential problems with the objectives of an effective safety program; 
• lines of intervention: early technical/strategic indications, to be integrated in the process safety 
management plan of the company. 
The results of the questionnaires were subjected to statistical analysis (ANOVA) with the aim of recognizing 
the significant variables affecting plant safety, including if errors attributable to behavioural violations of rules 
were present, as well as the level of risk perception and safety culture in the organization.  
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Figure 1: Assessment of Individual Dimension Figure  2: Assessment of Organizational Climate 
3. Results and Discussions 
As amply reported, knowledge on human aspects has enabled striking advances in productivity, safety and 
risk control, namely four main reasons can be identified for taking action on human factors (Fabiano et al., 
1995): 
• evidence that human factors represent a relevant percentage of accident causes;  
• need of identifying weakness in the training system and operator safety education;  
• awareness of the strategic  importance of developing a mature safety culture; 
• increased regulatory focus on issues related to human behavior. 
In Table 1, main findings of the questionnaires are outlined, referring to the four conceptual dimensions. 
Table 1: Items characterizing the four conceptual key dimensions. 
A Individual 
A1 Behavior Constitutes one of the key topics in the field of behavioral dimension and includes every 
aspect in relation to task execution. 
A2 Attitude towards safety Includes individual factors related to self -safety, consciousness and knowledge of the 
hazard associated to the process. 
A3 Reaction to 
near-miss/incident 
Includes the appropriate actions to anticipate or eliminate the hazard and prevent unsafe 
conditions or escalation of damage. 
B Organizational climate 
B1 Communication Incorporates the formal and informal communication in relation to plant items, operational, 
safety personnel and process. 
B2 Job stress  Involves aspects related to independence, ambiguity of roles and the production pressure. 
B3 Motivation Characteristics of sensitivity and adhesion of the staff to the strategic guidelines laid down 
by the company, particularly in the safety field. 
C Human resources management 
C1 Procedure Includes the procedures, permitting and practical application of regulations / safety 
regulations. 
C2 Education and training Element inherent in all education and training activities. 
C3 Accountability  Element tended to identify the degree of accountability and inter-level working group. 
D Equipment and technologies 
D1 Working conditions Refers to conditions of labor objectified by appropriate physical and situational indicators. 
D2 Risk prevention and  
mitigation 
Refers to the fixed equipment, addressing both risk prevention and protection, as well as 
PPE. 
D3 Layout and Maintenance Includes the technical aspects and the preventive and corrective actions in the different
plant sections. 
3.1 Individual 
Individual behavior of the workers was determined by dividing it into three further categories, i.e. behavior, 
safety attitude and reaction to unwanted events, with quantitative evaluations shown in Figure 1.  
• Behavior: results obtained from both internal and outsourced workers showed that, on a formal level, a 
clear behavioral attitude of respect and attention to the operating procedures for hazards relating to a 
specific activity was present, accompanied by a proactive operational approach. Data observed from 
internal workers questionnaire showed that, at least occasionally, 45.3 % of violations took place with the 
safety standards prescribed in relation to those risks, which were apparently considered less serious or 
less likely. For example, failure to use PPE was 53.6 %, failure to observe regulations on to vehicular 
traffic was 60.1 %, high places without climb ladders and application equipment or safety standards was 
37.8 %, etc. From the data obtained, it was also observed that daily workers paid less attention to the 
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general use of PPE (68.1 %) as compared to shift workers (40.9 %). Results obtained from outsourced 
workers revealed that 61.3 % of workers not always follow safety rules and prescribed procedures.  
• Attitude of workers towards safety reflected a good knowledge of emergency procedures, which evidently 
arises from specific trainings. For internal workers, attitude towards safety was good since 74.7 % of 
respondents commented about its effectiveness, and 70.2 % of the responses came from persons 
working in hazardous conditions. The 85.7 % of outsourced workers revealed the awareness of being in 
potentially hazardous situations. On the other hand, the 74.9 % of internal workers showed a clear conflict 
between pressure and productive behavior in terms of worker safety. This item is widely reported in the 
international literature (Fabiano et al., 2010) and is empirically confirmed by this study, being production 
pressure the main perceived cause of injury, with a percentage of 25.9 %. Alongside the behavioral 
attitude, there was also a significant tendency to by-pass relevant procedures (66.3 %).  Worker 
perceiving the feeling of being in an unsafe situation were those employed as shift workers (77.0 %), due 
to increased exposure time to the hazard-specific job. For outsourced workers, safety procedures were 
also not well known and applied only by 39.5 %. There was also a tendency of by-passing the procedures 
(56.0 % of respondents).  
• Reaction to near-miss/incident: 71.3 % of operational staff of internal workers claimed to be aware of 
accidents and to know their implications and consequences. Safety procedures were sufficiently known 
and there was a satisfaction level of 75.1 % in the sample. However, it was observed that the knowledge 
of the staff about the occurrence of accidents was limited to the immediate causes and it did not extend to 
the root causes.  
3.2 Organizational Climate 
Organizational climate plays an important role in judging the involvement of human factors in accidents. It 
comprises three categories, namely: communication, job stress, and motivation, evaluated as in Figure 2.  
• Communication: the 83.4 % of the responses of internal workers indicated good mutual communication 
and understanding among the people who make up their own operational staff; in addition, a good 
communication was maintained at the time of shift change. 77.3 % of outsourced workers perceived a 
satisfactory communication both with internal staff and the company, and highlighted the high level of 
mutual understanding in performing different tasks (87.0 %). However, 53.3 % of the internal workers 
reported problems of communication between operational staff and maintenance personnel; according to 
shift workers sample this percentage rose to 59.0 %.  
• Job stress and motivation: significant results were obtained from the answers of internal workers. The 
harmful effects of workplace injury are significant factors in the perceived stress levels rather than working 
pressure and hazards inherent to the refinery environment. The level of involvement in issues related to 
safety proved to be satisfactory overall, with a positive value. For outsourced workers, similar 
considerations could be developed considering outsourced companies, although the value, in this last 
case, is to be considered limited to the particular type of sample. For a limited number of internal 
operators, in some instances, the safety at the operational level was more regarded as compliance with 
legal requirements.  
3.3 Human Resources Management 
Human resources management is an important factor for any organization for judging the involvement of 
human factors in accidents. In this questionnaire, human resources management was evaluated considering 
three categories, namely: procedures, education/training and accountability. Results are depicted in Figure 3.  
• Procedures: for internal workers, results showed a positive response. 72 % of the workers showed 
positive intent to follow safety related procedures. As mentioned in earlier results, the problem of updating 
the procedures, and not merely formal compliance, was relevant. 87.4 % of the responses validated, 
related outsourced workers, showed a formal adherence to procedures for carrying out operations. A 
cross-analysis between the results of the questionnaire and adverse events or accidents evidenced that 
numerous procedures were not completely followed, or were completely disregarded, according to the 
73.9 % of the responses. The lack of definition of responsibilities in the procedures and the perception of 
limited clarity of procedures were the main cause of this attitude. Especially daily workers were involved in 
this failure. 63.2 % of the responses indicated the impossibility of finding a partner for the arising 
problems, while 73.0 % manifested explicit difficulties in applying certain procedures for the problems. For 
outsourced workers, as noted above, the procedures relating to personal safety were particularly 
disregarded and this item may pose an alert on the permitting/procedural system.  
• Education and training: in principle, workers owing to a good knowledge of emergency procedures, arising 
from a basic safety culture, consider the training important. Considering internal workers, only a small 
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percentage (8.9 %) of the responses showed less sensitivity/interest in training, while 73.7 % of 
respondents evidenced the effectiveness of training actions. Result was entirely consistent with the 
sensitivity to safety issues mentioned in the other dimensions. For outsourced workers, 96.8 % of 
operators followed a course of training in the last two years. The received training was considered 
satisfactory in 78.8 % of responses. 
For internal workers the firm investment and commitment to training was appreciated, even though the 
perception and effectiveness of the training program was not completely satisfactory. Results from 
outsourced workers revealed that the training received in relation to emergencies was satisfactory only in 
the 66.9 % of the responses. In this regard, it should be noted that in presence of a notable number of 
young temporary workers (age bracket 18–24 years), the level of formation and professional training per 
se may be not sufficient to replace the direct experience gained directly on-site, given the inherent 
hazards. 
• Accountability: for internal workers, the percentage of recorded events related to absence/inadequate 
permit to work were rather limited (14.1 %). In fact, based on the analysis of near-miss and accidents PTT 
events were mainly connected to outsourced workers e.g. during preventive programmed maintenance 
activities. Strategic management should be considered essential, even in the absence of near misses or 
adverse events, while it  is not appreciable a flow of information relating to safety deficiencies in the 
direction of the operating core. The efficacy and motivation for this flow of information is proportional to 
the actual findings that the operator receives as a follow up of management periodic surveys on the plant 
and planned/implemented corrective actions. As remarked, results evidenced that the safety procedures 
were by-passed in some instances, thus posing an alert for the permission procedure of the outsourced 
workers.  
 
   Figure 3: Assessment of Human Resource 
Management 
Figure 4: Assessment of Equipment and Technologies 
3.4 Equipment and Technologies 
Equipment and Technologies play vital role for any organization to judge the involvement of human factors in 
accidents and according to the developed framework, the topic was further explained under three categories, 
namely: working condition, protection & risk mitigation and lay out & maintenance (Figure 4).  
• Working conditions: for internal workers, all appropriate steps were faced promptly to effectively eliminate 
the uncomfortable conditions in the working environment, after the elaboration of adverse events recorded 
in the plant. The 90.7 % of the responses showed the presence of not optimal working conditions, with a 
percentage of 31.2 % evidencing the high frequency of occurrence. Hazardous deviations connected to 
work environment included obstacles with possible fall (96.2 %), construction not removed at the end of 
the work (93.9 %), and lack of adequate lighting (91.3 %). Despite the majority of internal operators 
perceived the presence of not optimal working conditions and shift workers emphasized a high frequency 
of occurrence, daily workers indicated them as occasional events. For outsourced workers, 92.3 % of the 
responses showed the occasional presence of not optimal working conditions.  
• Risk prevention and mitigation: internal workers considered PPE available, efficient (91.2 %) and easy to 
use.  Safety signs were perceived as reliable and understandable (74.8 %), in full compliance with current 
regulations in terms of general guidance and safety programme. Outsourced workers confirmed that PPE 
were available (90.6 %) and ease of use, safety signs were present and understandable. For construction 
sites, 81.3 % of the structures did not have adequate protection, as pointed out above by shift workers. 
Occasionally (33.3 %), safety equipment was in poor condition, as indicated by some adverse recorded 
events and not perfectly consistent with the procedures (51.7 %).  
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• Layout and Maintenance: results obtained from the oil plant layout and maintenance section revealed that 
there were minor gaps in the application of procedures for the inspection and control. They revealed 
frequent cases of severe corrosion and minor leaks from pipelines and piping, especially as it emerged 
from the analysis of adverse events and confirmed by the findings of the questionnaire (respectively 55.2 
% and 76.8 %). The presence of safety signs/warnings was optimal according to the regulations, even if 
the need for more immediate and understandable hazard indications of danger in critical hazardous areas 
of the plant or process steps was perceived by nearly 58 % of the workforce.  
4. Conclusions 
The approach provided an overview of the most important/urging actions, based on monitoring leading 
(proactive monitoring) and lagging (reactive monitoring) indicators. Starting from the recognition of the most 
influencing factors, this study highlighted gaps in the management system that could be remedied and showed 
which layers of protection require effective implementation in practice for risk prevention or mitigation. 
Practical actions include the issues of process safety formation, interpretative vigilance, on-plant training, site 
and group audits, ensuring compliance with established safety procedure and corporate safety culture. 
Training is of particular importance to refinery personnel in relation to the specific knowledge and process 
plant; therefore, its execution should be entrusted with experience in the same field. Additionally, the targets 
set by the HSE policy and consistently oriented according to the approach of "zero accident" should be 
integrated with an objective indicator of performance improvement on an annual basis. This indicator, to be 
developed based on a trend line drawn in the short to medium term, may represent annual target of immediate 
perception suitable to increase staff motivation. A further result is the increasing level of safety awareness of 
the employees that can be improved by a systematic survey, as the conventional philosophy of making 
workers responsible for hazard identification and providing proper assessment guidelines may not be sufficient 
to reduce accident rates. 
References 
Abrahamsen E.B., Abrahamsen H.B., Milazzo M.F., Selvik J.T., 2017, Using the ALARP principle for safety 
management in the energy production sector of chemical industry, Reliab. Eng. Syst. Safe, 169, 160-165. 
Chauvin C., Lardjane S., Morel G., Clostermann JP., Langard B., 2013, Human and organisational factors in 
maritime accidents: Analysis of collisions at sea using the HFACS, Accident Analysis and Prev., 59, 26– 37. 
Chen S.T., Wall A., Philip Davies P., Yang Z., Wang J., Chou YH., 2013, A Human and Organisational Factors 
(HOFs) analysis method for marine casualties using HFACS-Maritime Accidents (HFACS-MA), Safety Science 
60, 105–114. 
De Rademaeker E., Suter G., Pasman H. J., Fabiano B., 2014, A review of the past, present and future of the 
European Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, 92, 280-291. 
Fabiano B., Parentini I., Ferraiolo A., Pastorino R., 1995, A century of accidents in the Italian industry - Relationship 
with the production cycle, Safety Science, 21, 65-74. 
Fabiano B., Currò F., Reverberi A. P., Pastorino R., 2008, A statistical study on temporary work and occupational 
accidents: Specific risk factors and risk management strategies, Safety Science, 46, 535-544.   
Fabiano B., Reverberi .P., Varbanov P.S., 2019, Safety opportunities for the synthesis of metal nanoparticles and 
short-cut approach to workplace risk evaluation, Journal of Cleaner Production, 209, 297-308. 
Fabiano B., Currò F., Reverberi A.P., Pastorino R., 2010, Port safety and the container revolution: A statistical study 
on human factor and occupational accidents over the long period, Safety Science, 48, 980-990.   
Fabiano B., Currò F., 2012, From a survey on accidents in the downstream oil industry to the development of a 
detailed near-miss reporting system, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 90, 357-367. 
Fabiano B., Vianello C., Reverberi A.P., Lunghi E., Maschio G. 2017, A perspective on Seveso accident based on 
cause-consequences analysis by three different methods, J. Loss Prevent. Proc., 49, 18-35. 
Kontogiannis T., 2012, Modeling patterns of breakdown (or archetypes) of human and organizational processes in 
accidents using system dynamics, Safety Science, 50, 931–944.  
Reniers G., Gidron Y., 2013, Do cultural dimensions predict prevalence of fatal work injuries in Europe? Safety 
Science, 58, 76-80. 
Sikorova K., Bernatik A., Lunghi, E., Fabiano, B., 2017, Lessons learned from environmental risk assessment within 
the framework of Seveso Directive in Czech Republic and Italy, J. Loss Prevent. Proc., 49, 47-60. 
Vairo, T., Del Giudice, T., Quagliati, M., Barbucci ,A., Fabiano B., 2017, From land- to water-use-planning: A 
consequence based case-study related to cruise ship risk, Safety Science, 97, 120-133. 
Wiegmann, D.A., Shappell, S.A., 2003, A human error approach to aviation accident Analysis: The human factor 
analysis and classification system, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, UK. 
288
